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Slotting allowances are fees paid by manufacturers to get access to retailers’ shelf space. Both 
in the USA and Europe, the use of slotting allowances has attracted attention in the general 
press as well as among policy makers and economists. One school of thought claims that 
slotting allowances are efficiency enhancing, while another school of thought maintains that 
slotting allowances are used in an anti-competitive manner. In this paper, we argue that this 
controversy is partially caused by inadequate assumptions of how the retail market is 
structured and organized. Using a formal model, we show that there are good reasons to 
expect anti-competitive effects of slotting allowances. We further point out that competition 
authorities tend to use an unsatisfactory basis for comparison when analyzing welfare 
consequences of slotting allowances. 
JEL Code: L13, L42, L81. 
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Slotting allowances are ﬁxed fees that manufacturers pay to retailers in order to get
access to their shelf space. While slotting allowances were hardly known before the
late 80’s, they are now widely used, not least in the grocery industry. The boost of
slotting allowances has coincided with a trend towards higher retail concentration.
In Europe, in particular, the grocery retailing sector has become strikingly more
concentrated over the last decades (Dobson and Waterson, 1999, and Clarke et al.,
2002). Thereby retailers’ market power over manufacturers has increased, and there
is a broad consensus that this is the major reason why the use of slotting allowances
h a sb e c o m em o r ew i d e s p r e a d . 2 However, economists (and policy makers) disagree
as to whether slotting allowances tend to mitigate retail competition. The main
purpose of the present paper is to help resolve this controversy, and draw some
policy implications.
Two schools of thought dominate the debate over welfare eﬀects of slotting al-
lowances. The so-called market power school argues that slotting allowances may
have anti-competitive rationales (Shaﬀer, 1991). To see why, suppose that a retailer
can choose between contract A, with no slotting allowances and a low wholesale
price, and contract B, where the retailer receives a slotting allowance from the man-
ufacturer but in return pays a higher wholesale price. Since slotting allowances are
up-front payments, marginal costs for the retailer are thus relatively high in contract
B. By signing this contract, the retailer sends a signal to her rivals that she will be
a soft competitor and set a relatively high end-user price. This in turn induces the
rivals to raise their prices too. Shaﬀer shows that this mechanism may lead us to an
equilibrium where retailers use slotting allowances as a device to increase end-user
2According to a US-based survey by Bloom et al. (2000), retailers and manufactures agree that
greater retail power has contributed to more use of slotting allowances also in this country. This is
true even though retail concentration is much lower in the USA than in Europe. See also Rey, Thal
and Vergé (2005), who further note that in the UK even the products of leading manufacturers
typically ”represent a very small proportion of the total business for each of the major suppliers”.
In contrast, also the largest manufacturers are highly depend on their major buyers (Rey et al
2005, p. 3).
1prices. This has a negative welfare eﬀect.3
In contrast, the eﬃciency school argues that slotting allowances have positive
welfare eﬀects, for instance by solving problems connected to uncertainty and/or
asymmetric information, and by allocating scarce shelf space.4 The eﬃciency school
dismisses Shaﬀer’s hypothesis that slotting allowances are used as a tool to soften
retail competition, one of their main arguments being that retailers and manufac-
turers typically enter secret contracts. Thereby wholesale prices are unobservable,
and cannot be used strategically to increase end-user prices.
In our view, a main problem with both the eﬃciency and the market power
school is their assumption on how the market is structured and organized. First,
both schools of thought presuppose that there are only two layers; manufacturers
at the upstream level and retailers at the downstream level. A second presumption
they have in common, is that each retailer behaves like a vertically integrated ﬁrm
in its decision on procurement contracts and retail pricing. However, this is not a
proper description of the grocery market, especially not in Europe. Indeed, what we
have observed is that large retail chains have formed procurement alliances (buyer
groups), such that the level of concentration is higher for procurement than for re-
tailing (see Dobson and Waterson, 1999).5 In these constellations, the headquarters
of each buyer group typically deals with procurement, while the retail sub-chains
take care of retailing (e.g. end-user pricing). Even when sub-chains are fully owned
3Slotting allowances may also reduce product variety through foreclosure of smaller suppliers.
Shaﬀer (2005) shows speciﬁc market structures where such practice may be optimal. Marx and
Shaﬀer (2004) demonstrate that retailers may also beneﬁt from foreclosure of suppliers, since this
may shift proﬁt from the manufacture-level to the retail level.
4See further discussion in Section 3.
5The largest food buyer in Germany is the buyer group Markant Handels. The buyer groups
Euromadi and IFA Espanñola are the two largest food buyers in Spain, and Intermarché dominates
in France (Dobson and Waterson, 1999). In Norway, the largest retailer group, NorgesGruppen
(NG), was formed as a buyer group in 1994. Even though there has been a process of closer
integration, NG may still be considered as a buyer group where the headquarters takes care of
procurement, and each store brand decides end-user prices autonomously. Several of the retail
formats within NG are also independently owned by the retailers themselves. An overview of the
Nordic markets is given by the Danish Competition Authority (2005).
2by the procurement headquarters, they are typically organized as divisionalized
ﬁrms.6 We show that in this context each buyer group will use slotting allowances
to dampen intra-retailer competition even if rival retail chains cannot observe the
wholesale contracts. As long as the procurement contracts can be observed within
each buyer group, which is a plausible assumption, they can transfer their buying
power into the retail market by using slotting allowances.
This paper contains a relatively broad discussion of antitrust issues. First, we
show that our ﬁndings are supported by several antitrust investigations of the gro-
cery industry in Europe (European Commission, 1996, Competition Commission,
2000, Danish Competition Authority, 2005, and The Norwegian Competition Au-
thority, 2005). Second, we emphasize the importance of recognizing the degree of
substitutability that exists between diﬀerent kinds of vertical restraints. Consider a
buyer group of independent retailers. They cooperate in the procurement market,
but compete at the retail level. Building on our formal model, we argue that by
using a vertical restraint like a slotting allowance, the group can achieve the same
outcome as they would with vertical integration. In the latter case, decisions on pro-
curement and end-user pricing are taken by the group’s headquarters. Consequently,
it is pointless to outlaw slotting allowances if the competition authorities would not
ban a merger among alliance members. Vice versa, if a potential merger between
the ﬁrms raises serious doubts by the competition authorities, slotting allowances
should raise the same concerns.
1.1 Related Literature
The present paper is an extension of Shaﬀer (1991), who considers competition
between two retailers in the end-user market. By assuming that the retailers have
6Thus, while the headquarters decide procurement contracts centrally, each sub-chain is rela-
tively autonomous with respect to end-user pricing. The leading Finnish retailer groups, Kesko and
Tuko, are orgainized in this a way (The European Commission,1996), and the same holds for ICA’s
retailing operations in Norway (NCA, 2005). Just one of the four dominating Norwegian retailer
groups operates a completely vertically integrated ﬁrm with respect to procurement contracts and
retail pricing (NCA, 2005).
3complete bargaining power over manufacturers, Shaﬀer (1991) shows that it is in
the interest of each retailer to set a high wholesale price in the contract with the
manufacturer. When wholesale prices rise, retail competition softens. Thus the
total proﬁt made by the vertical chain increases, and this proﬁti sc a p t u r e db yt h e
retailers through slotting allowances.
Shaﬀer’s idea is based on the strategic delegation literature, where Fershtman
and Judd (1987) is the seminal paper. Gal-Or (1991), Bonanno and Vickers (1988)
and Rey and Stiglitz (1988, 1995) build on the same framework, but they assume
that the bargaining power is in the hands of the suppliers. Irmen (1998) shows that
the outcome in this case resembles the one found by Shaﬀer (1991). The diﬀerence is
the sign of the ﬁxed fee.7 Consequently, the strategic delegation theory is consistent
with the observation that the use of slotting allowances has increased as bargaining
power has been transformed from the manufacturing level to the retailing level.
A critical assumption within the strategic delegation literature is that the con-
tract between a manufacturer and a retailer is irreversible, so that wholesale prices
are determined prior to the price game between retailers. We agree with Rey and
Stiglitz (1995) that this is likely to hold. The reason is that retailers rarely have
long-term contracts with their customers, while the wholesale contractual arrange-
ments often are set for no less than a year. Moreover, the type of wholesale contracts
(e.g. slotting allowances or not) will typically be speciﬁed in long-term contracts
(see e.g. discussion by Rey and Stiglitz, 1995).
The second critical assumption employed by Shaﬀer and other papers in the
same tradition, is that wholesale tariﬀs are observed by rival retailers. This assump-
tion is more dubious than that of irreversibility.8 However, we show that slotting
7If the retailers have the bargaining power, a ﬁxed fee is paid by the suppliers, deﬁned as a
slotting allowance. If the suppliers have the bargaining power, the ﬁxed fee is paid by the retailers,
denoted as a franchisee fee.
8The Norwegian Competition Authority (NCA) doubts that slotting allowances can be used
by retailers as a facilitating practice a la Shaﬀer (as claimed in the press), since they ﬁnd the
assumption of contract observability unrealistic (NCA, 2005, and Gabrielsen and Sørgard, 2005).
However, NCA has initiated an investigation to clarify the extent of information exchange between
retailer groups.
4allowances may be used as a tool to increase end-user prices even if wholesale tar-
iﬀs are observable only within each buyer group. Indeed, this is one of the main
messages of the present paper. Consequently, we show that the boost of slotting
allowances may be related to the way the large retailer groups are organized, and
not to the increase in retail market power as such. Slotting allowances have become
more widespread at the same time as large retailer groups have started to operate
several sub-chains as buyer groups or as divisionalized companies.
Finally, our paper is related to Rey, Thal and Vergé (2005), who analyze a
context where two diﬀerentiated retailers sell goods bought from one common sup-
plier (common agency situation). Rey et al assume that the retailers have complete
bargaining power over the manufacturer, and show how retailers may use slotting al-
lowances to obtain monopoly prices in the end-user market.9 Even though Rey et al
abstract from the formation of buyer groups, and we abstract from common agency
problems, both papers thus ﬁnd that slotting allowances may harm consumers by
increasing end-user prices.
2T h e m o d e l
We consider a market where n retail chains sell the same homogenous product.
The consumers may diﬀer in their chain preferences. To capture this we extend























The parameter v>0 in equation (1) is a measure of the market potential, qi is
the quantity from retailer chain i,a n dn ≥ 1 the number of chains. The parameter
9More precisely, Rey et al show how the retailers can solve the common agency problem and
achieve monopoly proﬁt by using slotting allowances and a conditional ﬁxed fee (i.e., a fee which
is conditional on the retailers actually purchasing from the manufacturer). Interestingly, this kind
of tariﬀ structure may eliminate the risk of anticompetitive exclusion. This is in contrast to the
result in Marx and Shaﬀer (2004), who restrict attention to a two-part tariﬀ.
5b ∈ [0,1] is a measure of how diﬀerentiated the chains are; they are completely
independent and have monopoly power if b =0 , while the consumers perceive them
to be identical if b =1 . More generally, the chains are closer substitutes from the
consumers’ point of view the higher is b.10 The merit of using this utility function
is that the size of the market does not vary with b or n (see Motta, 2004).
Let pi be the price charged by retail chain i. Solving ∂U/∂qi − pi =0for
i =1 ,....,n we ﬁnd that the inverse and the direct demand curves are given by
respectively:
pi = v −
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Assume that retail chain i pays wi per unit of the manufacturing good, and let
Si be the ﬁxed fee speciﬁed in the contract between the chain and the manufacturer.
The proﬁt level of chain i is then
π
R
i =( pi − wi)qi(p1,...pn)+Si.
If Si > 0 we have a slotting allowance.
The proﬁt level of the manufacturing ﬁrm serving chain i equals
π
M
i = wiqi(p1,...pn) − Si,
w h e r ew eh a v en o r m a l i z e dm a r g i n a lc o s ta tt h em a n u f a c t u r e rl e v e lt oz e r o . A si n
Shaﬀer (1991), we assume that the manufacturing sector is perfectly competitive
with a large number of ﬁrms producing the same good.
Below, we consider the following two-stage game:
• At stage 1, the procurement headquarters (PHQ) of each retail chain decides
what kind of contract to oﬀer a manufacturer. Without slotting allowances, the
10Shaﬀer (1991) uses a general demand function, but uses the Shubik-Levitan speciﬁcation with
n =2in his welfare analysis.
6manufacturing ﬁrm’s participation constraint requires that wi ≥ 0,w h i l ew i t h
slotting allowances the PHQ sets the tariﬀ Ti =( wi,S i) such that πM
i ≥ 0.11
• At stage 2 the retail chains compete in prices.
T h eg a m ei ss o l v e db yu s i n gb a c k w a r d - i n d u c t i o n . F o rt h em o m e n tw es h a l l
assume that all prices are observable and irreversible. Setting ∂πR
i /∂pi =0for
i =1 ,...,n we ﬁnd that the ﬁnal stage gives rise to the reaction function
pi =










nv(1 − b)(2n − b)+( n − b)
Ã





(n(1 − b)+( n − b))(2n − b)
. (5)
The outcome of stage 1 depends on whether or not the retail chains have formed
procurement alliances. We consider these two cases separately. First we consider a
market structure without procurement alliances, as illustrated in Figure 1a (where
n =4 ). This is the market structure which is typically assumed in the literature.
Second, as illustrated in ﬁgure 1b, we consider a market structure with procurement
alliances.
Each (sub-) chain consists of a large number of retail outlets, but we abstract
from the competition between these. The reason for this is that competition between
retail outlets belonging to the same sub-chain is typically eliminated through the
franchising contract between the sub-chain and its retail outlets; e.g. since the end-
user prices for the basic assortment are decided at the sub-chain level (see further
discussion in Section 3).
11While Shaﬀer (1991) assumes that the manufacturers announce the wholesale tariﬀs, we assume
that each PHQ oﬀers a take-it-or-leave-it contract. This does not aﬀect the qualitative outcome.













Figure 1a: Without 
procurement alliances

















Figure 1a: Without 
procurement alliances




Figure 1: Market structures
2.1 Benchmark: No procurement alliances
Suppose that the retail chains do not cooperate on purchases. In the absence of
slotting allowances, perfect competition in the manufacturing sector implies that
wi =0and πM












Equation (6) makes it clear that the end-user price is decreasing in b, reﬂecting
t h ef a c tt h a tt h eﬁrms have to set a lower price the higher the competitive pressure.
Note that we have marginal cost pricing (pnsa
B =0 )i fb =1 , since the chains are
then perceived to be perfect substitutes.






n)+Si subject to πM
i ≥ 0.S i n c et h em a n u f a c -
turing sector is perfectly competitive, we have πM
i =0and wiq∗
i = Si. This allows



























(2 − b)n(n − b)






















In this section we shall make the following critical assumption:
Assumption 1: Assume that the retail chains can commit to the wholesale tariﬀs
and that the tariﬀs are observable by the rivals.






(n(1 − b)+( n − b))(2n − b)
> 0 for b>0. (9)
Retail chain i0s end-user price is increasing in its own marginal costs. Since prices are
strategic complements in retail competition, it follows that an increase in wi leads
the rivals to charge higher prices. This strategic eﬀect explains why ∂p∗
j/∂wi > 0
for b>0.
In the symmetric equilibrium we can set wi = w ∀i.12 Using equations (7) - (9),
we ﬁnd that the per-unit wholesale price is given by:
w
sa
B =( 1− b)b
2 (n − 1)vn
(n − b)
¡
n2 (1 − b)(3− b)+( n − b)
2¢ ≥ 0. (10)
From equation (10) we immediately see that wsa
B is positive if and only if 0 <
b<1. The reason for this is that with imperfect competition, each chain has an
incentive to choose a relatively high per-unit wholesale price in its contract with the
manufacturing ﬁrm, since this will invoke a positive price response from the rivals.
This strategic eﬀect is, however, weak for small values of b, and non-existent for
b =0 . Therefore wsa
B (b =0 )=0 . It should further be noted that the direct eﬀect
12It can be shown that this is a unique equilibrium if Assumption 1 holds.
9is always stronger than the strategic eﬀect (∂pi/∂wi >∂ p j/∂wi). In particular, this
means that if a retail chain should try to set wi > 0 for b =1 , then that chain
would lose all its sales to its rivals. This explains why also wsa
B (b =1 )=0 . The
incentive to set a high value on the wholesale unit-price is consequently strongest
for intermediate values of b.
Equation (10) further implies that ∂wsa
B /∂n < 0, reﬂecting the fact that the
incentives to set a low per-unit wholesale price in order to steal business from the
competitors is larger the greater is n.




B =( 1− b)
(2 − b)vn2
n2 (1 − b)(3− b)+( n − b)
2, (11)
while the size of the slotting fee equals
S =( 1− b)b
2 (n − 1)v2 ¡




n2 (1 − b)(3− b)+( n − b)
2¢2. (12)
Equation (12) makes it clear that the relationship between S and b is hump-
shaped, as illustrated in Figure 1.13 This is a direct consequence of the fact that wsa
B
reaches a maximum for an intermediate value of b. Since wsa
B is decreasing in n, we
likewise see that the slotting fee is smaller the larger the number of retail chains.













Figure 1: Slotting allowances and retail competition.







n(1 − b)+( n − b)
w
sa
B ≥ 0. (13)
From (13) it is easily veriﬁed that the price diﬀerence with and without slotting
allowances is hump-shaped, just like wsa
B and S. T h ef a c tt h a tt h ep r i c ed i ﬀerence
reaches maximum for an intermediate value of b was ﬁrst demonstrated by Shaﬀer
(1991).
If Assumption 1 does not hold, the wholesale unit-price cannot be used for strate-
gic purposes (since ∂p∗
j/∂wi =0when chain j cannot observe wi).I n t h i s c a s e i t
follows that w =0 and p = pnsa
B .
We summarize the results in the following lemma:
Lemma 1: Without procurement alliances:
11(i) Slotting allowances are not used if wholesale contracts cannot be observed.
(ii) Slotting allowances are used to soften competition if the consumers perceive
the retail chains to be imperfect substitutes, psa
B − pnsa
B > 0 for 0 <b<1.
(iii) Slotting allowances will be highest for an intermediate degree of retail chain
substitutability.
Moreover, we have the following relationship between slotting allowances and the
number of retail chains:
Proposition 1: Slotting allowances are lower the larger the number of retail
chains.
These results are hardly surprising. Slotting allowances may be seen as a form
of nonlinear wholesale pricing, i.e. a two-part tariﬀ with a negative ﬁxed fee. It
is well known that it is generally harder to implement non-linear pricing when the
degree of competition increases, whether this is due to a larger number of ﬁrms or
a higher substitutability. Hence, the results in Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 simply
r e s e m b l et h eo u t c o m et h a tt w o - p a r tt a r i ﬀs are harder to implement the stronger the
competition.
Nevertheless, Sudhir and Rao (2006) claim that price raising slotting allowances
theoretically should be higher the larger the number of chains and the less diﬀerenti-
ated they are (captured by n and b, respectively, in our model).14 In an investigation
of whether slotting allowances have anti-competitive eﬀects, the Norwegian Com-
petition Authority (2005, p. 55) likewise maintain that ”if [Shaﬀer’s] theory is any
good”, one should observe slotting allowances to be higher the ﬁercer the compe-
tition between the chains. Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 make it clear that this is
incorrect.
We suspect the belief that slotting allowances are increasing in the extent of com-
petition, is partly caused by a lack of accuracy in distinguishing between incentives
and abilities. The stronger the competition, the more the chains have to gain from
using slotting allowances to raise prices. However, the gains from undercutting the
14See Section B1 and the appendix in Sudhir and Rao (2006).
12r i v a l sa r ea l s op a r t i c u l a r l yl a r g ei ft h ec o n s u m e r sp e r c e i v et h ec h a i n st ob em o r eo r
less identical. Indeed, this is very much the essence of the Bertrand Paradox.
2.2 Procurement alliances among retailer chains
Two key features of the grocery retail industry have not been taken into account
in the literature. First, in most countries we observe relatively large buyer groups,
each consisting of several sub-chains (or brands). Second, while the headquarters
of the buyer groups take care of procurement activities, the sub-chains seem to be
quite autonomous with respect to end-user pricing.
Let us now assume that we have two alliances at the procurement level. For the
sake of simplicity we assume that there are two sub-chains in each buyer group, such
that n =4 , with retail chains 1 and 2 b e l o n g i n gt oP H Q 1a n dc h a i n s3a n d4t o
PHQ2. Hence, we have the market structure in Figure 1b. In order to focus on the
diﬀerences from the benchmark case, we shall now make the following assumption:
Assumption 2: Assume that wholesale contracts are observable within, but not
between, each buyer group.
We consider the same two-stage game as above, and without slotting allowances
it is straightforward to show that the price, pnsa
PD, resembles the outcomes from the









With slotting allowances, it is useful to denote by w
PHQ1
i the wholesale unit price
paid by sub-chain i =1 ,2 in Alliance 1, and by w
PHQ2
k the corresponding prices in
Alliance 2 (for k =3 ,4). By using equation (5), we can then write the outcome in


















(8 − b)(8− 5b)
,
(14)




























At the ﬁrst stage PHQ1 solves
Π




(pi − wi)qi + Si
subject to wiqi + Si ≥ 0 and equations (14) and (15). Since PHQ1 cannot observe




k =0 . Using that wiqi = Si,























































Because wholesale contracts are unobservable between the buyer groups, the
procurement headquarters cannot use the wholesale contracts strategically to raise
the rival’s prices. However, each buyer group is aware of the fact that the rival has in-
centives to use slotting allowances to soften competition between its own sub-chains.
Assuming that each procurement headquarters has correct expectations about the
rival’s wholesale contract (which seems reasonable, since there is no uncertainty in
the model), we ﬁnd a unique symmetric equilibrium where
w
sa
PD =( 1− b)b
2v
(4 − 3b)(4− b)
. (16)
A si nt h eb e n c h m a r kc a s e ,w et h u ss e et h a tt h ew h o l e s a l eu n i tp r i c ei sp o s i t i v ef o r
b ∈ (0,1).
By inserting for wsa








Hence, the use of slotting allowances will in general increase the end-user price even







(4 − 3b)(8− 5b)
> 0 for b ∈ (0,1). (18)
Equation (18) expresses one of the main messages of the paper, namely that
wholesale tariﬀs need not be perfectly observable for slotting allowances to increase
end-user prices.15 It is suﬃc i e n tt h a tt h et a r i ﬀs are observable within each buyer
group, which seems like a plausible assumption. First, it is reasonable to assume
that the sub-chains have the right of access to the accounts of the alliance. Second,
and more importantly, the sub-chains have a common interest in organizing the al-
liance system such that the wholesale tariﬀs are internally observable and credible.
Thereby, each buyer group can proﬁtably employ price raising slotting allowances.
This is true irrespective of whether the other buyer group uses slotting allowances.
Put diﬀerently, it is a dominant strategy for each buyer groups to use slotting al-
lowances for b ∈ (0,1). This outcome does not depend on the symmetric market
structure.
It is straight forward to show that the end-user price is independent of whether
the sub-chains set prices competitively, as we have assumed, or whether the end-user
price is set centrally by the procurement headquarters. In both cases the end-user
price is given by equation (17). This clearly illustrates how eﬀectively slotting
allowances can be used to soften competition even if the wholesale contracts are
unobservable across the buyer alliances. The assumption that the buyer groups
have correct expectations about each other’s wholesale contracts, is of course a
simpliﬁcation which is due to the information structure in the model. However,
we believe that it corresponds pretty well with reality. In its investigation of the
Norwegian retail market, the Norwegian competition authorities found that even
15With perfect observability, the wholesale contracts could be used to soften competition between
the buyer groups. This would not change the qualitative results, but would lead to even higher
end-user prices.
15though the contracts between each buyer group and the producers were secret, the
essence of the procurement contracts was widely known. This was revealed by the
internal documents found in the investigated ﬁrms by the Norwegian Competition
Authority, and it was conﬁrmed by the respective market participants.16
We summarize our results into the following two propositions:
Proposition 2: With procurement alliances (buyer groups) among retail chains
and b ∈ (0.1), slotting allowances will increase end-user prices even though wholesale
contracts are unobservable across buyer groups.
Proposition 3: With procurement alliances among competing retail chains,
slotting allowances are used to transfer procurement market power into the less con-
centrated retail market. The anti-competitive eﬀects of using slotting allowances are
strongest for an intermediate degree of retail substitutability.
Consequently, without slotting allowances (and other analogous vertical restraints)
the degree of retail competition depends on the number of retail chains (n)a n dt h e
degree of diﬀerentiation (b). With slotting allowances the degree of retail compe-
tition depends on the number of procurement alliances rather than the number of
r e t a i lc h a i n s .I nf a c t ,i ft h e r ei sam o n o p o l ya tt h ep r o c u r e m e n tl e v e lw eh a v et h e
following result (proof, see Appendix) :
Proposition 4: With slotting allowances and procurement monopoly, the pro-
curement headquarters is able to ensure monopoly proﬁt even if there is ﬁerce com-




PM = v/2 independent of the number of retail chains and substitutability
between the retail chains.
To counteract the eﬀects of retail chain competition, the PHQ thus sets a unit
wholesale price which is increasing in b and n if we have a procurement monopoly.
The procurement headquarters is consequently able to neutralize competition be-
tween the retail chains by choosing an appropriate wholesale unit price - the com-
bination of retail competition and slotting allowances yields the same proﬁta n d
16The Norwegian Competition Authority (2005, pp. 55).
16consumer prices as if the procurement headquarters was able to eliminate retail
competition and set the cartel prices directly. Thus, control over the end-user prices
or the wholesale price schemes has the same impact on the end-user prices and
proﬁts.
T h ef a c tt h a tt h e r ei sap o s i t i v er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nt h es i z eo fs l o t t i n ga l -
lowances and the extent of retail competition if and only if we have a procurement
monopoly, has implications for empirical analysis. If Sudhir and Rao (2006) had
found support for their hypothesis that slotting allowances are increasing in retail
competition, we would have had an indication that the PHQs operate as a de facto
cartel.17 It is certainly reassuring that the data did not support this hypothesis.
Nonetheless, the results above show that competition authorities should be highly
suspect of cooperation between PHQs even if it could be proved that there is unre-
stricted competition between the retail chains. Moreover, we have recently observed
a development towards procurement alliances among large buyer groups. In Nor-
way, for instance, the three largest buyer groups (NG, ICA and Coop) are members
of a joint venture that takes care of IT-systems on logistic and transport. Such
procurement alliances may increase the information exchange between competing
buyer groups, particularly if it is in their interest to do so.18
17It should be noted that the theoretical approach employed by Sudhir and Rao is ﬂawed. First,
they use a utility function where the size of the market and the consumers’ willingness to pay for a
good are increasing in b. Second, they make a technical error which means that they are actually
not considering a competitive equilibrium.
18In addition to the increased concentration at national level, we have witnessed cross national
mergers as well as buyer groups. Cross-national procurement alliances have so far not raised
antitrust concerns, since they generally tend to have only one member from each nation. However,
Dobson, Waterson and Davies (2003) emphasize that the inter-linkages between national and cross-
national procurement alliances combined with cross-ownership by the large multinational retailers
increase the potential for information exchange.
173 Policy implications
The European Commission has generally approved both procurement alliances and
horizontal mergers between retailers in the market for daily consumer goods (Dobson
and Waterson, 1999, Clarke et al., 2002). One exception is the proposed merger
between two of the leading Finnish retailer groups, Kesko and Tuko, which prior to
the proposed merger had domestic market shares of approximately 40% and 20%,
respectively.19 Both Kesko and Tuko own several sub-chains, and these receive
franchising fees from the connected retailers. Procurement conditions are taken
care of by the headquarters of Kesko and Tuko, while end-user prices for the basic
assortments are decided at the sub-chain level.20
In their merger application, Kesko claimed that it was organized as a pure buyer
group with no vertical restraints limiting internal competition between their retail
sub-chains. If this were the case, one could reasonably expect strict retail com-
petition between the sub-chains and even between retailer outlets within the same
sub-chain.
However, Kesko’s argument was not accepted by the Commission. In their inves-
tigation the Commission revealed that competition between retailer outlets within
each sub-chain was severely hampered by the franchising contracts. As mentioned
above, end-user prices were decided on the sub-chain level for the basic assortment.
Moreover, the Commission found that the franchising contracts did not include fees
for the use of logotypes, slogans, marketing assistance and so forth. Instead, the sub-
chains charged the outlets for such services through adding margins on the goods
passed on to the retailers. Consequently, the retailers’ marginal costs increased,
which in turn raised end-user prices for products where each retail outlet decides
the end-user price.
By the same token, Kesko’s headquarters has incentives to implement restraints
that limit competition between sub-chains. Indeed, the Commission argues that the
relationship between the headquarters and the sub-chains resembles the relationship
19See, European Commission Decision of 20 11 1996, Case no. IV/M. 784. - Kesko/Tuko.
20Additionally, there are also some independent retail chains that cooperate with Kesko and
Tuko at the procurement level.
18between the sub-chains and the retailers: “... it has to be concluded that the
horizontal cooperation and lack of competition within each of these ﬁve Kesko chains
constitutes a structural feature of the Kesko group, and as such of the Finnish retail
market. The same is also true for whatever competition that may seem to exist
between the ﬁve chains, since the main elements of that competition have, in fact,
been centrally planned by Kesko”. Consequently, the Commission concluded that
the market power at the procurement level could be transmitted into the retail
market.
As shown in the present paper, slotting allowances may be used as an instru-
ment to soften competition between sub-chains by increasing wholesale prices. This
resembles the device used by Kesko’s sub-chains in the franchising contract with
retailers, where marketing and other support services oﬀered by the sub-chain were
added on the goods rather than charged through ﬁxed franchising fees. Moreover, a
contract with a third party (the supplier) through slotting allowances has a higher
degree of commitment and transparency than other forms of strategic transfer pric-
ing. Other things equal, slotting allowances may be considered as a superior tool to
implement strategic transfer pricing.
Most of the eﬃciency rationales behind slotting allowances are concerned with
challenges regarding new product introduction. Under asymmetric information,
where the manufacturer has private information about e.g. product quality, slotting
allowances may be used as a signalling or screening device (Chu, 1992, Lariviere
and Padmanabhan, 1997, and Desai, 2000). However, Bloom et al. (2000) and
Rao and Mahi (2003) ﬁnd no support for slotting allowances as a signalling device.
Interestingly, in their survey Bloom et al. ﬁnd that neither US manufacturers nor
the retailers believe that slotting allowances serve as a signal or screening device.
The Norwegian Competition Authority reports the same view among Norwegian
manufacturers and retailers (NCA, 2005). In contrast, Sudhir and Rao (2006) and
Sullivan (1997) ﬁnd some empirical support for the signalling rationale. However,
even proponents of the view that slotting allowances solve problems with asymmet-
ric information, emphasize that there may be alternative instruments.21 In cases
21Desai (2000), for instance, argues that advertising by the manufacturers is a substitute to
19where the retailer does not fear that the manufacturer will go bankrupt, buy-back
guaranties are an alternative signalling and screening device (NCA, 2005). Manufac-
turers that accept buy-back guaranties are more likely to have high quality. Slotting
allowances may also be used to balance the risk between manufacturer and retailers
regarding new products.22 However, buy-back guaranties will also be an alternative
to slotting allowances for this rationale (Sudhir and Rao, 2006).
Moreover, the degree of information asymmetry in favor of manufacturers seems
to be exaggerated. The majority of “new” products hardly gives rise to information
problems, and slotting allowances are also used for established products (Federal
Trade Commission, 2001, Competition Commission, 2000, and NCA, 2005).23
A ﬁnal eﬃciency rationale is that slotting allowances help retailers to allocate
scarce shelf space in an appropriate way (Sullivan, 1997, Larivieri and Padmanab-
han, 1997 and Desai, 2000). Certainly, slotting allowances may be a way to bid
for shelf space, but other instruments exist. The obvious one is for manufacturers
to oﬀer reduction in the unit wholesale price. In a recent analysis, the Norwegian
Competition Authorities ﬁnd that such rebates contingent on the access to attractive
shelf space are used in Norway (NCA, 2005).
Thus, several analyses support the hypothesis that alternative instruments exist
for the vast majority of the claimed eﬃciency beneﬁts of using slotting allowances
(Bloom et al, 2000, Sudhir and Rao, 2006, NCA, 2005). What begs a question
then, is why do ﬁrms prefer to use slotting allowances to extract these eﬃciency
beneﬁts? Suppose that both slotting allowances and an alternative tool may solve a
given eﬃciency problem. However, slotting allowances have the side eﬀect that they
soften retail competition. The latter eﬀect will reduce the social gain from slotting
allowances (even if the total eﬀect on welfare should be positive). Consequently, it
seems reasonable to assume that retailers prefer to use slotting allowances over an
alternative tool that just solves the eﬃciency problem. These concerns suggest that
slotting allowances in order to signal the potential of a new product. If advertising is eﬀective,
manufacturers will probably prefer to use advertising (given that the goal is only to signal quality).
22Bloom et al. (2000) ﬁnd support for this among manufacturers as well as retailers.
23See e.g. Davies (2001) and Bloom et al (2000).
20antitrust authorities should not just ask whether the eﬃciency eﬀects of slotting
allowances dominate the anti-competitive eﬀects. They should also ask whether
the eﬃciency eﬀects could be achieved in other ways without the anti-competitive
side-eﬀects related to slotting allowances. Indeed, Rey and Stiglitz (1995 pp. 446)
propose that competition authorities should be suspicious towards vertical restraints
“unless there can be shown to be signiﬁcant eﬃciency-enhancing eﬀects that (a)
could not be obtained (at reasonable cost) in other ways, without the ensuing anti-
competitive eﬀects, and (b) that outweigh any anti-competitive eﬀects”.
Finally, our results indicate that competition authorities should have a more
critical view on procurement agreements also on logistics, transport etc.24 It is
important to emphasize that buyer groups may beneﬁt consumers even when in-
volving competing ﬁrms.25 Our concern is, however, that the buyer power at the
procurement level may be reinforced at the retail level. Procurement alliances may
have eﬀects similar to those of cross licensing where ﬁrms reciprocally have access
to patent protected technologies. As noted by Motta (2004, pp.205 and 206) “...
the best situation for competition would arise when cross licenses are royalty free,
or when they specify ﬁxed payments rather than unit royalties, as the latter would
amount to higher variable costs and reduced output”. Thus, Motta (2004) empha-
sizes that competition authorities should scrutinize “ancillary restraints” that call
for payments of per-unit royalties to the joint venture. This is exactly what slotting
allowances do - they implement per unit royalties to the procurement alliance.
24The use of slotting allowances may be a part of a more comprehensive choice of procurement
system (IT, logistic and transport systems). Göx (2000) shows that when transfer prices are not
observable, a strategic alternative may be to commit to an accounting system which deviates from
marginal cost pricing. When average costs are above marginal costs, a commitment to an account-
ing system based on full cost based transfer prices may resemble the outcome with observable
transfer pricing. By the same token, the choice of a procurement system that incorporates slotting
allowances may be a way to commit to transfer prices above the marginal costs.
25However, as shown by Dobson and Waterson (1997) countervailing buyer power may have
negative welfare eﬀects even without ancillary restraints.
214 Concluding remarks
Both in the USA and in Europe, the use of slotting allowances has attracted attention
i nt h eg e n e r a lp r e s sa sw e l la sa m o n gp o l i c ym a k e r sa n de c o n o m i s t s . I nN o r w a y ,
which has the highest retail concentration in Europe26, slotting allowances generated
a widespread debate during winter and spring 2005. The press claimed that the
retailers used slotting allowances to dampen end-user competition, and in this paper
we have shown that the emergence of large buyer groups has increased the potential
for using slotting allowances to raise prices. As long as wholesale contracts are
observable within each buyer group, slotting allowances may harm competition.
Hence, the extensive and increased use of slotting allowances is consistent with the
increase in buyer groups and divisionalized retailer groups that operate several retail
sub-chains.
If the rationale behind slotting allowances and high wholesale prices is simply
to reduce competition within a given buyer group, the practice may be seen as a
form of strategic transfer pricing. An alternative could be that the procurement
alliance operates a warehouse that charges the sub-chains a transfer price above
the wholesale price.27 Gabrielsen and Sørgard (2005), in a study for the Norwegian
Competition Authority, maintain that there is no reason why ﬁrms should prefer
to use slotting allowances as a way to practice strategic transfer pricing. However,
this argument hardly holds if there is also competition between retailers belonging
to diﬀerent buyer groups. The reason is that a contract with a third party (the
manufacturer) has a higher commitment value than manipulation of internal transfer
prices. Consequently, we believe that slotting allowances have a higher strategic
potential than pure internal transfer pricing.
Theoretical as well as empirical analyses indicate that eﬃciency enhancing and
anti-competitive rationales for slotting allowances coexist. Regarding policy implica-
tions, our main message is that analyses of slotting allowances should try to integrate
eﬃciency enhancing and anti-competitive eﬀects. Competition authorities should
26The four dominating retail groups controlled 99.7% of the retail grocery market in 2000.
27See e.g. Schjelderup and Sørgard (1997).
22recognize the fact that alternative instruments exist for eﬃciency enhancing motives
as well as for anti-competitive motives. When retailers (or manufacturers) prefer
to use slotting allowances to solve eﬃciency problems, even if alternative instru-
ments exist, there is reason to believe that slotting allowances have anti-competitive
side-eﬀects that beneﬁtt h eﬁrms.
5A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
Maintaining the assumption that the retail chains compete in prices, the solution
to the last stage is given by equations (4) and (5) also with a procurement monopoly.
At stage 1 the PHQ monopoly oﬀers each manufacturer a take-it-or-leave-it con-
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To counteract the eﬀects of retail chain competition, the PHQs thus set a unit
price which is increasing in b and n. Indeed, inserting for (19) into (5) we ﬁnd that
psa
PM = v/2, which is identical to the monopoly price.Q.E.D.
6 References
Bloom, P.N., G.T. Gundlach, and J.P Cannon. 2000. Slotting allowances and fees:
Schools of thought and the view of practicing managers, Journal of Marketing, 64,
92-108.
23Bonanno, G. and J. Vickers, 1988, Vertical Separation, Journal of Industrial
Economics, 36, 257-265.
Chu, W. 1992. Demand signaling and screening in channels of distribution,
Marketing Science, 11(4), 324-347.
Clarke, R., S. Davies, P. Dobson, and M. Waterson. 2002. Buyer power and
competition in European food retailing, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited; Massa-
chusetts, USA.
Competition Commission. 2000. Supermarkets: A report on the supply of gro-
ceries from multiple stores in the United Kingdom, Cm4842, TSO, London.
Danish Competition Authority, 2005, Nordic Food Markets - a taste of compe-
tition.
Davies, R.W. 2001. Slotting allowances and antitrust, Antitrust, (Spring), 69-76.
Desai, P. 2000. Multiple messages to retain retailers: Signaling new product
demand, Marketing Science, 19(4), 381-389.
Dobson, P.W. and M. Waterson. 1997. Countervailing power and consumer
prices, Economic Journal, 107, 418-430.
Dobson, P.W. and M. Waterson. 1999. Retailer power: recent developments and
policy implications. Economic Policy (April), 135-164.
Dobson, P.W., M. Waterson and S.W Davies. 2003. The patterns and implica-
tions of increasing concentration in European food retailing, Journal of Agriculture
Economics, 54(1), 111-125.
European Commission. 1996. European Commission Decision of 20 11 1996
declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common market (Case no.
IV/M. 784. - Kesko/Tuko).
Federal Trade Commission. 2001. Report on the Federal Trade Commission
Workshop on slotting allowances and other marketing practices in the grocery in-
dustry. Washington D.C, US Government Printing Oﬃce.
Fershtman, C. and K.L. Judd. 1987. Equilibrium incentives in oligopoly, Amer-
ican Economic Review, 77, 927-940.
Gabrielsen, T.S. and Sørgard, L. 2005. Hylleplassavgifter: Bedriftsøkonomiske
motiver og samfunnsøkonomiske konsekvenser, The Norwegian Competition Author-
24ities.
Gal-Or, E. 1991. Duopolistic Vertical Restraints, European Economic Review,
35, 12371253.
Göx, R. F. 2000. Strategic transfer pricing, absorption costing, and observability,
Management Accounting Research, 11, 327-348.
Irmen, A. 1998. Precommitment in competing vertical restraints, Journal of
Economic Surveys, 12(4), 333-359.
Lariviere, M. and V. Padmanabhan. 1997. Slotting allowances and new product
introductions, Marketing Science, 16(2), 112-128.
Marx, L.M. and G. Shaﬀer. 2004. Slotting Allowances and Scarce Shelf Space,
Working Paper.
Motta, M. 2004. Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
The Norwegian Competition Authority (NCA). 2005. Payment for Shelf Space
(Betaling for hylleplass), Report 2/05.
Rao, V.R and H. Mahi. 2003. The price of launching a new product: Empirical
evidence on factors aﬀecting the relative magnitude of slotting allowances, Marketing
Science, 22(2), 246-268.
Rey, P. and J. Stiglitz. 1988. Vertical Restraints and Producers’ Competition,
European Economic Review, 32, 561-658.
Rey, P. and J. Stiglitz. 1995. The role of exclusive territories in producers’
competition, RAND Journal of Economics, 26, 431-451.
Rey, P., J. Thal and T. Vergé. 2005. Slotting allowances and conditional pay-
ments. Mimeo.
Schjelderup, G. and L. Sørgard. 1997. Transfer Pricing as a Strategic Device for
Decentralized Multinationals, International Tax and Public Finance, 4, 277-290.
Shaﬀer, G. 1991. Slotting allowances and retail price maintenance: A comparison
of facilitating practices. RAND Journal of Economics, 22(1), 120-135.
Shaﬀer, G. 2005. Slotting Allowances and Optimal Product Variety, B.E. Jour-
nals in Economic Analysis & Policy, 5 (3).
Sudhir, K. and V.R. Rao. 2006. Are slotting allowances eﬃciency-enhancing or
25anti-competitve?, Journal of Marketing Research, forthcoming.
Sullivan, M.W. 1997. Slotting allowances and the market for new products.
Journal of Law & Economics, 40(2), 461-493.
26CESifo Working Paper Series 




1736 Per Engström and Bertil Holmlund, Tax Evasion and Self-Employment in a High-Tax 
Country: Evidence from Sweden, May 2006 
 
1737 Erkki Koskela and Mikko Puhakka, Cycles and Indeterminacy in Overlapping 
Generations Economies with Stone-Geary Preferences, May 2006 
 
1738 Saku Aura and Thomas Davidoff, Supply Constraints and Housing Prices, May 2006 
 
1739 Balázs Égert and Ronald MacDonald, Monetary Transmission Mechanism in Transition 
Economies: Surveying the Surveyable, June 2006 
 
1740 Ben J. Heijdra and Ward E. Romp, Ageing and Growth in the Small Open Economy, 
June 2006 
 
1741 Robert Fenge and Volker Meier, Subsidies for Wages and Infrastructure: How to 
Restrain Undesired Immigration, June 2006 
 
1742 Robert S. Chirinko and Debdulal Mallick, The Elasticity of Derived Demand, Factor 
Substitution and Product Demand: Corrections to Hicks’ Formula and Marshall’s Four 
Rules, June 2006 
 
1743 Harry P. Bowen, Haris Munandar and Jean-Marie Viaene, Evidence and Implications of 
Zipf’s Law for Integrated Economies, June 2006 
 
1744 Markku Lanne and Helmut Luetkepohl, Identifying Monetary Policy Shocks via 
Changes in Volatility, June 2006 
 
1745 Timo Trimborn, Karl-Josef Koch and Thomas M. Steger, Multi-Dimensional 
Transitional Dynamics: A Simple Numberical Procedure, June 2006 
 
1746 Vivek H. Dehejia and Yiagadeesen Samy, Labor Standards and Economic Integration in 
the European Union: An Empirical Analysis, June 2006 
 
1747 Carlo Altavilla and Paul De Grauwe, Forecasting and Combining Competing Models of 
Exchange Rate Determination, June 2006 
 
1748 Olaf Posch and Klaus Waelde, Natural Volatility, Welfare and Taxation, June 2006 
 
1749 Christian Holzner, Volker Meier and Martin Werding, Workfare, Monitoring, and 
Efficiency Wages, June 2006 
 




1751 Robert Fenge and Jakob von Weizsäcker, Mixing Bismarck and Child Pension Systems: 
An Optimum Taxation Approach, June 2006 
 
1752 Helge Berger and Michael Neugart, Labor Courts, Nomination Bias, and 
Unemployment in Germany, June 2006 
 
1753 Chris van Klaveren, Bernard van Praag and Henriette Maassen van den Brink, A 
Collective Household Model of Time Allocation - a Comparison of Native Dutch and 
Immigrant Households in the Netherlands, June 2006 
 
1754 Marko Koethenbuerger, Ex-Post Redistribution in a Federation: Implications for 
Corrective Policy, July 2006 
 
1755 Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm and Heinrich Ursprung, The Impact of Globalization on 
the Composition of Government Expenditures: Evidence from Panel Data, July 2006 
 
1756 Richard Schmidtke, Private Provision of a Complementary Public Good, July 2006 
 
1757 J. Atsu Amegashie, Intentions and Social Interactions, July 2006 
 
1758 Alessandro Balestrino, Tax Avoidance, Endogenous Social Norms, and the Comparison 
Income Effect, July 2006 
 
1759 Øystein Thøgersen, Intergenerational Risk Sharing by Means of Pay-as-you-go 
Programs – an Investigation of Alternative Mechanisms, July 2006 
 
1760 Pascalis Raimondos-Møller and Alan D. Woodland, Steepest Ascent Tariff Reforms, 
July 2006 
 
1761 Ronald MacDonald and Cezary Wojcik, Catching-up, Inflation Differentials and Credit 
Booms in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union: Some Implications for EMU and new EU 
Member States, July 2006 
 
1762 Robert Dur, Status-Seeking in Criminal Subcultures and the Double Dividend of Zero-
Tolerance, July 2006 
 
1763 Christa Hainz, Business Groups in Emerging Markets – Financial Control and 
Sequential Investment, July 2006 
 
1764 Didier Laussel and Raymond Riezman, Fixed Transport Costs and International Trade, 
July 2006 
 
1765 Rafael Lalive, How do Extended Benefits Affect Unemployment Duration? A 
Regression Discontinuity Approach, July 2006 
 
1766 Eric Hillebrand, Gunther Schnabl and Yasemin Ulu, Japanese Foreign Exchange 
Intervention and the Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate: A Simultaneous Equations Approach 
Using Realized Volatility, July 2006 
 
  
1767 Carsten Hefeker, EMU Enlargement, Policy Uncertainty and Economic Reforms, July 
2006 
 
1768 Giovanni Facchini and Anna Maria Mayda, Individual Attitudes towards Immigrants: 
Welfare-State Determinants across Countries, July 2006 
 
1769 Maarten Bosker and Harry Garretsen, Geography Rules Too! Economic Development 
and the Geography of Institutions, July 2006 
 
1770 M. Hashem Pesaran and Allan Timmermann, Testing Dependence among Serially 
Correlated Multi-category Variables, July 2006 
 
1771 Juergen von Hagen and Haiping Zhang, Financial Liberalization in a Small Open 
Economy, August 2006 
 
1772 Alessandro Cigno, Is there a Social Security Tax Wedge?, August 2006 
 
1773 Peter Egger, Simon Loretz, Michael Pfaffermayr and Hannes Winner, Corporate 
Taxation and Multinational Activity, August 2006 
 
1774 Jeremy S.S. Edwards, Wolfgang Eggert and Alfons J. Weichenrieder, The Measurement 
of Firm Ownership and its Effect on Managerial Pay, August 2006 
 
1775 Scott Alan Carson and Thomas N. Maloney, Living Standards in Black and White: 
Evidence from the Heights of Ohio Prison Inmates, 1829 – 1913, August 2006 
 
1776 Richard Schmidtke, Two-Sided Markets with Pecuniary and Participation Externalities, 
August 2006 
 
1777 Ben J. Heijdra and Jenny E. Ligthart, The Transitional Dynamics of Fiscal Policy in 
Small Open Economies, August 2006 
 
1778 Jay Pil Choi, How Reasonable is the ‘Reasonable’ Royalty Rate? Damage Rules and 
Probabilistic Intellectual Property Rights, August 2006 
 
1779 Ludger Woessmann, Efficiency and Equity of European Education and Training 
Policies, August 2006 
 
1780 Gregory Ponthiere, Growth, Longevity and Public Policy, August 2006 
 
1781 Laszlo Goerke, Corporate and Personal Income Tax Declarations, August 2006 
 
1782 Florian Englmaier, Pablo Guillén, Loreto Llorente, Sander Onderstal and Rupert 
Sausgruber, The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit 
Auctions, August 2006 
 
1783 Adam S. Posen and Daniel Popov Gould, Has EMU had any Impact on the Degree of 
Wage Restraint?, August 2006 
 
  
1784 Paolo M. Panteghini, A Simple Explanation for the Unfavorable Tax Treatment of 
Investment Costs, August 2006 
 
1785 Alan J. Auerbach, Why have Corporate Tax Revenues Declined? Another Look, August 
2006 
 
1786 Hideshi Itoh and Hodaka Morita, Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the 
Holdup Problem, August 2006 
 
1787 Rafael Lalive and Alejandra Cattaneo, Social Interactions and Schooling Decisions, 
August 2006 
 
1788 George Kapetanios, M. Hashem Pesaran and Takashi Yamagata, Panels with 
Nonstationary Multifactor Error Structures, August 2006 
 
1789 Torben M. Andersen, Increasing Longevity and Social Security Reforms, August 2006 
 
1790 John Whalley, Recent Regional Agreements: Why so many, why so much Variance in 
Form, why Coming so fast, and where are they Headed?, August 2006 
 
1791 Sebastian G. Kessing and Kai A. Konrad, Time Consistency and Bureaucratic Budget 
Competition, August 2006 
 
1792 Bertil Holmlund, Qian Liu and Oskar Nordström Skans, Mind the Gap? Estimating the 
Effects of Postponing Higher Education, August 2006 
 
1793 Peter Birch Sørensen, Can Capital Income Taxes Survive? And Should They?, August 
2006 
 
1794 Michael Kosfeld, Akira Okada and Arno Riedl, Institution Formation in Public Goods 
Games, September 2006 
 
1795 Marcel Gérard, Reforming the Taxation of Multijurisdictional Enterprises in Europe, a 
Tentative Appraisal, September 2006 
 
1796 Louis Eeckhoudt, Béatrice Rey and Harris Schlesinger, A Good Sign for Multivariate 
Risk Taking, September 2006 
 
1797 Dominique M. Gross and Nicolas Schmitt, Why do Low- and High-Skill Workers 
Migrate? Flow Evidence from France, September 2006 
 
1798 Dan Bernhardt, Stefan Krasa and Mattias Polborn, Political Polarization and the 
Electoral Effects of Media Bias, September 2006 
 
1799 Pierre Pestieau and Motohiro Sato, Estate Taxation with Both Accidental and Planned 
Bequests, September 2006 
 
1800 Øystein Foros and Hans Jarle Kind, Do Slotting Allowances Harm Retail Competition?, 
September 2006 